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Gentrification or...? Injustice in large-scale residential projects in Hanoi
Abstract
Large-scale residential developments on expropriated lands in periurban Hanoi resemble 
forms of gentrification seen elsewhere. But is it gentrification? Current debate over the 
definition of gentrification has focused on whether the term has become too broad to be 
useful in different institutional and spatiotemporal contexts. While some push for a 
generalizable definition based in capitalist development, others argue that the term harbors 
Western assumptions that fail to usefully explain unique local circumstances. The paper first 
identifies one such conceptual assumption that must be made explicit since it provides the 
term’s politicizing thrust: displacement generates an experience of social injustice. Then, 
drawing on surveys and interviews with residents as well as interviews with real estate 
agents, government officials, and academics conducted in Hanoi between 2013 and 2017, the 
paper evaluates five types of displacement on the city’s outskirts. Because displacement only 
occurs in marginal cases and generates limited feelings of social injustice, the term 
“gentrification” is of little use. Instead, the paper suggests that in a context of rapid 
urbanization and relatively inclusive economic growth like that of Hanoi the terms 
“livelihood dispossession” and “value grabbing” may better capture the experience of social 
injustice and are therefore more likely to generate political traction.
Keywords: gentrification, social justice, Hanoi, periurbanization, large-scale residential 
projects.
Introduction
“The sense of injustice is eminently political.” (Shklar, 1992: 83)
The periurban landscape of developing Asia is undergoing a profound transformation typified 
by the expansion of urban forms, functions, and socio-economic relations into rural 
territories, often well beyond established city boundaries. An important instantiation of this 
process in the periurban zones of Hanoi is the massive development of large-scale residential 
projects geared towards the rising local upper-middle and upper classes and towards 































































expatriates. These comprise both master-planned communities of 20 hectares or more known 
as “new urban areas” (khu do thi moi in Vietnamese, hereafter NUA) and mixed-used 
commercial and residential complexes built on smaller sites. 
Most NUAs are built in densely settled peripheral areas where former agrarian communities 
and migrant populations drive a largely in situ urbanization. Since the 1980s, rural 
settlements around Hanoi have transformed into urban or quasi-urban places with limited 
geographical relocation of their populations. In contrast to city-based urbanization processes 
dominated by rural-urban migration, the populations living around Hanoi have expanded into 
non-agricultural work, adopted urban settlement patterns and housing forms, and embraced 
‘urban’ ways of life without permanently leaving their place of residence (Nguyen, 2009; 
DiGregorio, 2011). While increased incomes and living standards accompanied this in situ 
urbanization, Hanoi’s periurban areas are still home to significantly less wealthy populations 
(GSO, 2017).
The migration of capital and residents to these zones appears to be gentrification. The 
redevelopment of urban spaces for more affluent users situates this transformation in line 
with Hackworth’s (2002) definition of gentrification as “the production of space for 
progressively more affluent users”. But appearances may be deceiving.
Grounded in the comparative urbanisms debate, current disagreement over the definition of 
gentrification has focused on whether the concept has become too broad to be useful in 
different institutional and spatio-temporal contexts. While some authors push for a 
generalizable definition based in capitalist development (e.g., Lees et al., 2016), others argue 
that unique local circumstances call the application of the term “gentrification” into question 
(e.g., Maloutas, 2012; Yip and Tran, 2016). The latter contend that superficial similarities 
between local urban transformation and gentrification processes in the West disguise 
substantively different urban processes because they surreptitiously embody socio-spatially 
distinct ideological and ontological assumptions. Just because a process resembles 
gentrification in other locations does not mean that it is gentrification (e.g. Betancur, 2014; 
Ghertner, 2014). This concern with the applicability of “gentrification” is explored here 
through the case of Hanoi and its large-scale periurban residential developments.
This paper first outlines and responds to the debate over the applicability of generalized 
conceptions of gentrification, particularly in East Asia. Adopting a class transformation-based 































































notion of generalized gentrification, it then applies displacement experienced as unjust as a 
measure of gentrification to the test case of Hanoi. After offering evidence that displacement 
occurs only in marginal cases, we offer two alternative concepts that may better characterize 
the injustices experienced by our interviewees and offer more political traction: “livelihood 
dispossession” and “value grabbing”.
Generalized gentrification
In their proposal for a “planetary gentrification” research agenda, Lees et al. (2016: 203) 
conclude that the concept of “gentrification” is generalizable and applicable across a wide 
range of contexts. This conclusion lies at the current endpoint of a trajectory that began with 
Glass’s (1964) description of middle-class gentrifiers returning to London in the 1960s. This 
cultural and class specific concept of gentrification expanded to describe similar processes of 
neighborhood change in other Western contexts (e.g., Smith, 1986). Later it was used to 
describe not just residential but also commercial and even sectoral gentrification as 
commercial uses displace industrial uses (Clark, 1992; Lim et al., 2013). While the original 
notion of gentrification focused on individual homeowners, the range of actors involved 
quickly expanded. It soon became apparent that in some cities, real estate developers and the 
state play an active role in capturing rent by fostering gentrification. This consistent 
broadening of the term has led to a fairly common definition of gentrification as “the 
production of space for progressively more affluent users” (Hackworth, 2002: 815) (see also 
Clark, 2005). 
While generalized gentrification points to a core process that can be employed in 
comparative studies, others argue that such definitions are so open-ended that they lose their 
utility (Ghertner, 2014). Maloutas (2012), for instance, argues that gentrification is a 
historically, culturally, and geographically specific phenomenon and that this generalization 
of the concept has produced a “half-way de-contextualization” that distorts our understanding 
of non-Western urbanization by ignoring the particular circumstances under which the 
concept has been theorized, viz., deindustrialization, neoliberalism, and urban abandonment. 
Recent interventions build on this critique to interrogate the applicability of this broad 
conception of gentrification in non-Western contexts. One notable trigger was Ley and Teo’s 
(2014) argument that the absence of the term “gentrification” in government, newspapers, 
and academia despite its ontological reality in Hong Kong was evidence of an 































































epistemological gap that was only recently being reduced as the term gained currency. This 
article prompted a number of researchers based in and around Hong Kong to counterclaim 
that the absence of the term reflected its contextual inadequacy (Cartier, 2017).
This group’s objections follow two rough strategies. First, a “too narrow” strategy returns to 
earlier, more culturally and geographically narrow definitions of gentrification to argue that 
the term does not apply in East Asian cases (Lui, 2017; Tang, 2017). The second approach, 
which we call the “too broad” strategy, highlights the Western bias inherent in gentrification 
studies and contends that it blinds researchers to other relevant processes or 
conceptualizations like Hong Kong’s “culture of property” (Haila, 2017; Smart and Smart, 
2017; Tomba, 2017).
The “too narrow” strategy, however, ignores the methodological goal of generalizing the 
concept (cf. Boddy, 2007; Davidson and Lees, 2010). Broadening the definition to a mid-
level theory aims, at least for Lees et al. (2016), to facilitate comparisons across contexts, a 
position endorsed by Robinson (2015). Paradoxically, some of the works produced through 
this strategy show generalized gentrification’s methodological utility by demonstrating how it 
plays out in different contexts and by identifying other factors that must be incorporated to 
fully understand these local instantiations.
From the “too broad” perspective, Tomba (2017), however, suggests that generalized 
gentrification simply describes fundamental urbanization processes, especially in Mainland 
China. In the same vein, Haila (2017: 506) asks, “Does it really matter whether we call the 
phenomenon ‘gentrification’ or something else?” In this immediate sense, the answer is “no”. 
The broader definition of gentrification seeks to identify a political economic process of 
spatial and class transformation and is a product of the evolution of research on socially 
unjust neighborhood change. In a sense, then, the phenomenon could be called by a less 
culturally specific term. In the same way, those accusing Western-trained researchers of 
fetishizing “gentrification” and allowing the concept to limit their vision may also be guilty 
of the charge.
In another sense, naming does matter. The “too broad” strategy suggests that using the 
gentrification lens can limit researchers’ field of vision by carrying along unrecognized 
Western cultural baggage. This argument does not reduce to the claim that using the 
gentrification lens cannot work; it reduces to the claim that some researchers do a sloppy job 































































of exploring gentrification processes in other contexts, making the uncritical assumption that 
Western institutions and practices also apply in these other contexts. This paper seeks to 
excavate one of these assumptions to help avoid future misapplications of the gentrification 
lens. Specifically, it argues that gentrification is an inherently political term that is dependent 
upon the perception that a given transformation is socially unjust. 
Similar to Tomba (2017), Lim et al. (2013) have argued that the broad definition of 
gentrification matches that of redevelopment and aims to explain the same broad class 
transformation (see also La Grange and Pretorius 2014). Both terms describe the progressive 
displacement of poorer users by wealthier users. The central difference lies in one’s 
perception of whether the transformation is good or bad. Those who consider the outcomes to 
be positive (generally focusing on the new users) prefer to call the process redevelopment. 
Those who consider the outcomes to be negative (generally focusing on the displaced users) 
prefer to call it gentrification. As Robinson (2011: 22) reminds us, “The vocabulary we use 
can perpetuate certain assumptions about power relationships”. Though academics may 
conceive of the terms as strictly analytical, they remain political and are used to mobilize 
different and typically conflicting interests (see also Davidson and Lees, 2005; Lees et al., 
2008; Slater, 2009). The significance of this terminological politicization goes beyond 
pointing out that gentrification is deeply embedded in power relations. It also unearths at least 
one of the Western assumptions some scholars argue is buried in the concept of generalized 
gentrification: the presupposition that gentrification produces social inequality and injustice.
Displacement in Western cities is consistently experienced as socially unjust (e.g., Curran, 
2004; Slater, 2004; Newman and Wyly, 2006). And, as Marcuse (2010) argues, “If the pain 
of displacement is not a central component of what we are dealing with in studying 
gentrification...we are missing the central point that needs to be addressed”. But as Slater 
(2006) points out, for gentrification studies to retain their critical edge they need to more 
clearly identify the social injustice involved in displacement. 
This aligns with Shklar’s (1992) argument that, regardless of any purportedly objective 
determinations of injustice, individuals’ belief that they have experienced injustice and the 
accompanying indignation are essential for the politics of reconstructing social 
understandings of justice and remedying injustice. Shklar suggests that individuals consider 
negative outcomes that cannot be attributed to the concrete actions or inactions of others as 
‘misfortune’, while those attributable to others are considered ‘injustices’. The first leads to a 































































begrudging acceptance of fate, while the second engenders a “political sense of injustice” 
(114) that fosters political action. 
Shklar recognizes that the distinction between the two is blurry and shifting, but for her it 
depends fundamentally on social expectations, which evolve as social conditions, morality, 
and ideology change. She suggests, for example, that though being a woman was long seen as 
an unavoidable misfortune, as expectations of gender equality have increased over the last 
century, the experience of inequality has fostered a stronger sense of injustice and political 
mobilization. Such political mobilization can in turn lead to new forms of formal distributive 
justice through legislation and judicial processes. For Shklar, the experience of injustice 
drives the evolution of legal justice. 
We might similarly view the pain of displacement as indignation at the injustice of failing to 
realize social expectations of emerging rights, such as the right to affordable housing, the 
right to the city, and the right to community. Thus, to the extent that gentrification is a 
politicized term that works to secure such rights, displacement must be experienced as an 
affront to justice to constitute gentrification. This warrants a redefinition of gentrification that 
incorporates the perception that the process produces injustice. On this basis, we adopt a 
definition of generalized gentrification as the displacement of less affluent users by more 
affluent users that is experienced as socially unjust.
If the experience of social injustice is seen as central to a politicized conception of 
gentrification, then it is perhaps possible to reinforce Ley and Teo’s claims about Hong 
Kong. Rather than a form of intellectual colonialism, some scholars’ and activists’ 
application of the gentrification lens in that context would reflect their perception of injustice 
in Hong Kong’s ongoing class transformation. Meanwhile, the diminishing epistemological 
gap they report would indicate that displacement has not been experienced by local residents 
as socially unjust and therefore as “gentrification” but that there is an increasing perception 
that the class-based displacement is unjust. As will be shown below, this more nuanced 
notion also complicates efforts to label the case of periurban Hanoi as gentrification, as only 
some displaced persons experience redevelopment as unjust.
Analytical Framework and Methodology
To classify a given process as gentrification in accordance with our definition, it is thus 































































necessary to demonstrate that displacement has occurred and that it is experienced as unjust. 
In a seminal article, Marcuse (1985) identified four types of displacement that fall under two 
categories. The first category of direct displacement includes physical and economic 
displacement. Physical displacement refers to the forcible, physical eviction of existing 
residents. Economic displacement refers to residents being forced to move because they are 
unable to afford housing in their current neighborhood. The second category of indirect 
displacement includes exclusionary displacement and displacement pressure. Exclusionary 
displacement refers to the inability of households to move into neighborhoods they 
previously would have been able to move into. Displacement pressure, meanwhile, refers to 
rising prices inducing current residents to move out before they are actually priced out.
To these four types of displacement Davidson and Lees (2010) add phenomenological 
displacement, a form of indirect displacement. They argue that displacement goes beyond 
mere spatial displacement, that is, the moment of forced exit from a particular space. Rather, 
displacement entails an ontological scission between the person and the security or identity 
embedded in one’s lived experience of a place. Thus, this form of displacement refers to the 
loss of a way of life or local identity due to neighborhood change.
The academic literature offers at least two suggestions supporting the view that large-scale 
periurban residential developments like those around Hanoi constitute a form of 
gentrification. First, Smith’s notion of the rent gap has been employed to inform both 
gentrification and periurbanization. The rent gap refers to the difference between the 
capitalized ground rent (the land value based on current rent) and the potential ground rent if 
the property were redeveloped. When the potential ground rent exceeds that of the capitalized 
ground rent and amortized redevelopment costs, there is pressure to redevelop the property 
for more affluent users (Smith, 1996). That is, there is gentrification pressure. This notion is 
at the core of political economic understandings of gentrification and was developed to 
explain them (cf. Lees et al., 2008), but it has also been applied to periurbanization. Shatkin 
(2017), for instance, has argued that the rent gap between the capitalized ground rent of 
agricultural land in periurban areas and the potential ground rent of new master-planned 
developments drives periurbanization in several developing Asian countries. This claim is 
aligned with a second set of arguments that large-scale redevelopment can constitute “new 
build gentrification” (Davidson and Lees, 2005), especially in the rapidly urbanizing Global 
South. Ha (2004) and Shin (2009), for instance, have argued that such developments have 































































been the preeminent form of gentrification in Korea. Periurbanization thus generates 
pressures that often reallocate land use from agricultural to residential, positioning periurban 
gentrification as a type of sectoral gentrification by which a “newer and higher use” displaces 
agricultural uses.
So there is reason to hypothesize that the construction of NUAs around Hanoi involve 
displacement that may generate an experience of injustice, positioning them as a solid test 
case for what Waley (2015: 618) has termed “rice-paddy gentrification.” Additionally, 
selection of a novel case offers two benefits. First, it eliminates preexisting bias in making a 
determination of whether or not gentrification has taken place. Second, it establishes a ground 
for future studies.
Our test case analysis draws on an array of data collected in Hanoi between 2013 and 2017. 
We rely on a survey of Hanoi’s NUAs and on a review of relevant policy papers, research 
reports, and newspaper clippings related to land and property redevelopment in Vietnam. A 
dozen interviews with individuals working in government, banking, real estate, and academia 
were conducted to augment these sources of information and enhance our understanding of 
real estate development in Hanoi.
We also draw on semi-structured interviews with residents of urbanized villages upon whose 
agricultural land three NUAs were built: Linh Dam, Trung Hoa-Nhan Chinh, and Van Quan. 
These projects display key characteristics of the first generation of NUAs built in the late-
1990s and early 2000s: They are located relatively close to the city centre, were invested in 
and developed by state-owned enterprises, and originally targeted Vietnam’s emerging urban 
middle-class (see Table 1). All three projects entailed forced appropriation of agricultural 
lands but none involved residential expropriations. Such expropriations however occurred for 
a road-widening project near at least one NUA studied (Trung Hoa-Nhan Chinh).
[Table 1 about here.]
Focusing on first generation NUAs allowed us to explore their short- and long-term 
displacement impacts on the populations living next to them. In particular, we could 
document how this population experienced and reacted to NUAs taking over the agricultural 
land they used to till and to the multiple social, spatial and economic changes these 
redevelopments brought about in their locality. 































































We conducted 60 interviews with representatives of local households in the urbanizing 
villages listed in Table 1 except Yen Xa for which we could not secure authorizations. The 
politically sensitive nature of land expropriations limited our ability to freely select 
households. Initial informants had to be recruited through local authorities, but a relaxing of 
this control thereafter gave us more freedom to select participants through snowball 
sampling. We sought to reach households with various profiles in terms of educational 
qualifications, land holdings, and livelihood diversification prior to the NUA construction. A 
majority of the selected households (n=39) lost agricultural land-use rights to the NUA. This 
purposeful sampling aimed to capture the experience of the long-term residents assumed to 
be most negatively affected by the projects. The sample also included a handful of local 
leaders in each community (e.g., heads of residential groups and local communist party cells). 
Our semi-structured interview covered three main themes: evolution of livelihood strategies 
before and after redevelopment, socioeconomic opportunities and obstacles generated by the 
NUA, and perception of changing socio-spatial relationships. Data from these interviewees is 
complemented by observations of activities at the interface of the former villages and NUAs 
and of social interactions in the public spaces of both areas.
Displacement in Hanoi
Displacement
This section considers each of the five types of displacement in the context of periurban 
Hanoi. Yip and Tran (2016) argue convincingly that there is effectively no direct 
displacement by large-scale residential projects in Hanoi’s inner-city, as they are typically 
built on uninhabited brownfield sites. They do not, however, consider NUAs in periurban 
areas. Our survey shows that between 1993 and 2016, approximately 27,000 hectares were 
forcefully appropriated for the construction of 252 NUAs across Hanoi. Some complexes are 
built on smaller sites (10 ha or less), occupy brownfields or other types of “vacant” land, but 
these represent less than a quarter of all NUAs. The remaining 75 percent are much larger 
redevelopments (20 to 3,000 ha) built on agricultural lands originally farmed by neighboring 
populations. In these periurban areas, households typically possess land use rights over 
residential land in former village spaces and, in the case of farming households, also over 
agricultural land around it.
Over the last two decades, the Vietnamese state progressively leveraged the limited property 































































rights that users have over these lands and strengthened its powers to forcefully recover vast 
tracts of agricultural land and to transfer them to corporate actors for commercial 
redevelopment (Labbé, 2014). Land redevelopment for NUAs rarely involves residential 
evictions, but this process separates preexisting periurban households from the productive 
lands upon which their livelihoods still partially depend, an aspect further explored below. 
NUAs can nevertheless induce direct displacement. Residential land is often expropriated in 
order to provide the supporting infrastructure that connects NUAs to the city center. 
Residential projects may also encroach marginally upon existing villages, leading to 
residential expropriations. While comparatively small in scale, direct physical displacement 
can and does occur in Hanoi.1
Some marginal indirect displacement also takes place. At first glance, exclusionary 
displacement would not seem to apply in Hanoi, since new developments are typically built 
on non-residential lands. Since the 1980s, local governments in periurban areas have been 
permitted to reclassify agricultural land adjacent to existing residential zones, subdividing 
and allocating them to local households in need of more housing space (Labbé, 2014). As 
NUA projects often appropriate the entire agricultural zone surrounding former villages, they 
remove the possibility of future residential expansions. This has several implications. At the 
household scale, it reduces the housing options of newly married couples in poorer local 
families who typically have limited residential land and cannot afford the new housing units 
in the neighboring NUA. Echoing a Western gentrification phenomenon (eg., Newman and 
Wyly, 2006), they are left with a choice between moving away and living in overcrowded 
conditions. Commenting on this enclosure, a man living in an urban village next to the Linh 
Dam NUA remarked, “Our generation didn’t have to worry because [residential] lands were 
bequeathed to us by our ancestors, so we could rely on that.… But for our grandchildren, it 
will be much more difficult” (15 July 2013).
In a more complex way, there are other interactions with displacement pressure in Hanoi. 
New commercial activities (cafés, restaurants, hair salons, franchise convenience stores, etc.) 
generally emerge next to large residential projects. Often located at the interface between old 
villages and NUAs, these businesses tap into the middle- and upper-middle class customer 
base introduced by the NUA and therefore tend to offer products and services above the 
1 Large-scale residential expropriations for the construction of NUAs has occurred in other 
Vietnamese cities (cf. Harms, 2016).































































means of or at odds with the needs of the pre-existing populations (e.g., upscale spas and hair 
salons, private English-language schools, and international travel agencies).
While this represents a form of commercial upscaling, the question is who benefits from this 
change? Both observational and interview data show that residents who owned or bought 
residential plots adjacent to the three NUAs studied have either established their own 
commercial activities or rented ground level spaces to commercial enterprises. Commenting 
on this locational advantage, a villager who operates a teashop in his house remarked, “If 
there was no New Urban Area, I wouldn’t sell drinks like this. It’s because of this project that 
I could open this business” (Trung Hoa-Nhan Chinh, 28 June 2013). Though rarer, some 
households residing further into neighboring village spaces have also reported benefiting 
from or even establishing a new business because of the new customer base brought by the 
NUA. While these people now enjoy higher returns by operating or renting to businesses, the 
influx of a more affluent clientele has also boosted potential ground rent in adjacent 
neighborhoods, thereby excluding businesses that might otherwise have moved into the area. 
Phenomenological displacement is trickier to make sense of in the context of rapidly growing 
and modernizing economies. It is also the phenomenon that most profoundly interrogates the 
applicability of the gentrification concept in a place like Hanoi. In the neoliberal context of 
developed Western cities where inequality is rising and income growth predominantly goes to 
the already wealthy, such transitions tend to disrupt existing ways of life and the social 
networks on which the social security of precarious households increasingly depends (cf. 
Fullilove, 2005). It is therefore easy to understand why such phenomenological displacement 
is resisted by pre-existing residents in such a setting. However, in the context of rapid and 
widely—though unevenly—distributed economic growth, such changes may be welcome 
rather than resisted.
And such is the case in Hanoi. The introduction of large-scale residential developments 
represents a major transformation of place-based livelihoods and social relations. This was 
felt most strongly by households who lost their use-rights over agricultural lands for the 
construction of  NUAs. In interviews, members of these households regularly used 
expressions such as “hardship,” “strenuous,” and “unstable” to describe their lives in the first 
years following the land loss. Conversely, households who had stopped farming in the 1980s 
or 1990s, and therefore were not affected by the land expropriation, recalled having 
enthusiastically welcomed the NUAs.































































Yet, taking stock of the changes in their living environment and households’ economy a 
decade or more after the construction of the NUA, both farming and non-farming populations 
concur that these projects have, overall, ushered in a new era of prosperity and well-being. 
The positive changes mentioned include more business opportunities, a wider range of 
entertainment and services in their immediate vicinity (NUAs’ supermarkets, public parks, 
etc.), and a better quality of life. Many interviewees also emphasized the accompanying 
infrastructural improvements. “When the project was implemented,” a man living next to 
Trung Hoa-Nhan Chinh conveyed, “land was seized to build better infrastructure. Roads were 
raised to higher levels, water drainage was improved, there are more great buildings now, and 
the environmental sanitation is better” (28 June 2013). Looking back, most ex-farmers 
expressed a positive view of urban changes. Periurbanization did not necessarily make them 
wealthier—and, indeed, left some of them less well off. But many explained that it has put a 
welcome end to exhausting and precarious agricultural livelihoods and given them access to a 
small capital fund (i.e., monetary compensation) that they could invest in profitable ways. 
Moreover, in line with Ley and Teo’s (2014: 1291) recognition of the aspirational character 
of redevelopment, neighboring populations almost unanimously praise the NUA, describing it 
as “clean,” “beautiful,” “modern,” and “civilized.” Commenting on the construction of Linh 
Dam NUA, a housewife remarked, “I’ve been so happy to see the state build up the city 
properly” (15 July 2013). Another interviewee stated that urban development is making 
“everything more beautiful and civilized, from village to city” (26 June 2013). Harms (2016) 
comes to a similar conclusion in his research on two NUAs in Ho Chi Minh City. He finds 
that pre-existing populations, including those evicted by these projects, are often “very 
supportive of the project’s underlying development goals”. He argues that this support stems 
from the prevalent association of large-scale urban schemes with “a nationalist vision of 
Vietnam’s advance into modernity” (Harms 2016: 22). Thus, planned periurban land 
redevelopments represent a new way of life that is welcomed rather than resisted and does 
not thereby create phenomenological displacement. Or, perhaps more accurately, the 
phenomenological displacement so produced is not necessarily a negative experience.
 
This conclusion however requires nuance. Earlier studies have identified a generational 
difference in responses to periurban changes such as those discussed above (DiGregorio, 
2011; Labbé, 2014). While younger generations tend to be more accepting of the 
transformation of their communities, older generations are more likely to resist them. In all 































































three locations, people over 50 deplored the loss of the earlier “village culture” marked by 
solidarity and respect for traditional social roles and rituals. But it is not the NUA per se that 
appears to concern these people. Much more problematic for them are the massive numbers 
of rural migrants, suburbanizing dwellers, and expatriates who move into or use their former 
village space. These “outsiders” (nguoi ngoai), as some interviewees call this new 
population, not only outnumbers native villagers but are also seen as corrupting local mores. 
As a 50-year-old resident living next to the Trung Hoa-Nhan Chinh NUA explained:
[Urbanization] surely brought about many benefits for the people here. 
However, the most disturbing thing is the social safety. Gambling, drinking, 
and drug addiction affect young generations more than before. In the old days, 
the village was peaceful, but now there are many “love hotels,” karaoke,… 
Sometimes they fight and quarrel. So noisy all night! (22 June 2013)
Thus, despite a broad welcoming of phenomenological displacement, especially by the youth, 
it is also experienced negatively by some groups. To the extent that NUAs transform existing 
settlements, they, too, have this ambivalent impact.
Injustice
In Hanoi, as in Hong Kong, there is only limited evidence that urban transformation is 
experienced as unjust. In practice, there has been minimal opposition to urban transformation 
per se. Echoing DiGregorio’s (2011) and Harms’ (2016) findings, the individuals interviewed 
generally welcome such change, viewing it as both inevitable and generally desirable. This 
embrace of periurban transformation calls into question gentrification designations that rely 
on superficial similarities. The in-migration of more affluent households to periurban areas 
does not ipso facto constitute gentrification. Rather, as we have argued above, any notion of 
gentrification must include the experience of social injustice. This requires a careful 
evaluation of the forms of injustice generated by displacement.
Displacement as injustice? 
As discussed above, NUA development involves limited residential land expropriations, 
resulting in minimal direct physical displacement. In fact, when developers plan a new 
project, they make every effort to avoid encroaching on residential lands because of the 
extreme difficulties and high cost they incur when they try to displace households from their 































































residential land. This problem is, in turn, directly linked to the specific form of injustice 
generated by urban development projects in and around Hanoi.
Urban populations across Vietnam perceive direct residential displacement as extremely 
unfair. As Nguyen (2009) and Labbé (2014) have shown, Hanoi’s periurban residents “have 
long considered housing land as an inalienable form of property on which they can safely rely 
for the purposes of both social reproduction and economic production” (Labbé 2014: 174). 
Residential land is also seen as the safest way for households to protect and grow their 
wealth. In the absence of a strong social safety net, real estate acts as a form of insurance. 
Residential land also plays an important productive role in household economies, especially 
among the most vulnerable segment of the periurban population. Poorly educated ex-farmers, 
for instance, are largely excluded from Hanoi’s increasingly competitive urban labor market. 
These economically marginalized individuals often have no choice but to rely on their 
residential land for a living. In the three areas studied we found that after losing their 
agricultural land, these people tended to set up small businesses inside or next to their house 
(makeshift rental lodging for students and labor migrants, tea stalls, motorbike washing 
services, etc.). These generally become their main income source. Though the arrival of a 
NUA can boost residential land’s economic potential, this opportunity is eliminated when 
projects confiscate residential lands and relocate their occupants to high-rise apartment 
buildings where it is difficult, if not impossible, to set up a business.
So though a rare occurence, poorly compensated residential land confiscation spurs a strong 
sense of injustice among displaced populations. Their indignation drives political action to 
remedy this injustice: they petition governmental authorities, invite domestic media to cover 
their cases, and in some extreme instances, organize public protests or even take violent 
action (see Harms 2016: ch. 6). Reporters and scholars for the most part sympathize with 
expropriated households’ injustice claims, emphasizing the economic loss that results from 
direct displacements (e.g., Pham and Lam, 2000; Le, 2009). In contrast to situations 
documented in the West (Davidson and Lees, 2005; Fullilove, 2005), the deterritorialization 
process that follows from households’ relocation (e.g., loss of sense of place and dislocation 
of place-based community relations) is however either ignored or treated as a secondary 
problem.































































As discussed above, NUAs trigger two other indirect forms of displacement: indirect 
exclusionary displacement through land value increase and the enclosure of village 
settlements; and phenomenological displacement through the erosion of local social relations 
associated with an older “village culture.” Neither of these forms of displacement are 
perceived as unjust by the people living around the NUAs we studied. In the first case, the 
lack of residential land is generally seen as a misfortune and as a household-scale issue. In 
the second case, we have seen that phenomenological displacement is felt by only a segment 
of the pre-existing population. These people however do not blame NUA projects or their 
residents. They are much more concerned by the social impacts of large numbers of 
“outsiders” living in their midst. In short, both indirect forms of displacement are experienced 
as misfortune, not injustice. They are attributed not to the construction of a specific large-
scale residential project but to a much broader and inevitable periurbanization process.
Livelihood dispossession and value grabbing 
This is not to say that large-scale residential projects have not given rise to other forms of 
injustice around Hanoi. Quite the opposite: strong claims of injustice stem directly from these 
projects. But, echoing Maloutas’ (2012) and Ghertner’s (2014) arguments, gentrification falls 
short of capturing these injustices. This is because the claims of injustice expressed by 
Hanoi’s periurban people have little in common with the loss of place or of the sense of place 
as experienced in established neighborhoods of post-industrial cities. The injustices raised in 
Hanoi instead concern the distribution of the costs and benefits of land redevelopment as the 
country rapidly shifts from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban society and 
economy. At this stage in Vietnam’s urban transition, we suggest that concepts other than 
gentrification may more effectively evoke the injustices generated by large-scale residential 
developments. Here we briefly proffer two possibilities for future investigation: “livelihood 
dispossession” and “value grabbing”.
The notion of livelihood dispossession refers the loss of both livelihoods and natural capital 
that follows from agricultural land expropriation. But it is not the loss per se that informs this 
claim of injustice. Several dispossessed interviewees reported that they were ready to stop 
farming and had hoped that the next generation would be able to transition towards post-
agrarian livelihoods. In fact, many households had already started this process years earlier 
by diversifying their livelihood strategies or investing in their children’s education. The 































































injustice experienced is not that they cannot farm anymore. Rather, they begrudge the manner 
and speed with which they were compelled to make this livelihood transition. For this, they 
attribute blame to local governments and developers. Grievances included: low land 
compensation rate offered, limited employment opportunities in NUAs (as opposed to 
industrial zones), and insufficient time given to prepare their transition from farming. Some 
ex-farmers also complained about local government and investors’ failure to mitigate the loss 
of livelihoods engendered by agricultural land takings:
The investor promised to create jobs for the households whose land was taken.… 
Beside the [cash] compensation handed to us, they had promised to build 
companies and factories that would recruit the children of people having lost their 
land. [But] since the land acquisition, I haven’t seen any such announcement of 
recruiting the relatives of people who lost their land. (Trung Hoa-Nhan Chinh, 26 
June 2013)
The second most important area of contention might be considered a form of value grabbing, 
which Andreucci et al. (2017: 31) have defined as “the appropriation of (surplus) value 
produced elsewhere through rent—rather than accumulation” and positioned as a 
distributional concern. As is the case with most land expropriation practices around the 
world, land use rights holders in Vietnam are compensated not on the basis of potential 
ground rent but on actual pre-development ground rent. Thus, the increase in land value from 
urban redevelopment is grabbed away from pre-existing residents by businesses and 
governments involved in property development. Again, as in Hong Kong, claims of injustice 
have grown in Hanoi as this value grabbing becomes more evident. A woman living next to 
the Linh Dam NUA raised this issue as follows, “They gave us only 59,000 VND per m2 [in 
compensation for agricultural lands], then they built and sold buildings for billions. For 
example, the 70-80 m2 flats, they sell them at least 2-3 billion VND. It is right on this 
peninsula, right on my fields” (8 July 2013).
Activists, bloggers, reporters, and intellectuals (Vietnamese and foreign) regularly amplify 
residents claims of livelihood dispossession and value grabbing (e.g., Tran, 2006; Brown, 
2013; Taylor, 2014). Media practitioners in Vietnam (as well as foreign scholars) not only 
report but also broaden peasants’ claims, notably by denouncing the state and land 
developers’ appropriation of the value generated by periurban land redevelopment and by 































































highlighting its contradiction with the party’s egalitarian discourse (Labbé 2015). The claims 
of injustice put forth by these actors are however less concerned with the direct impact of 
projects and more with ways in which their surplus value is distributed.
Conclusion
We have argued that East Asian critiques of generalized gentrification stumble by insisting 
that the term is used too narrowly or too broadly. In the spirit of these critiques, however, we 
have unearthed a buried assumption in the Western literature on gentrification: displacement 
produces injustice. Following Shklar (1992), we argue that it is this experience of injustice 
that politically mobilizes the term “gentrification” and that the absence of a “political sense of 
injustice” calls the attribution into question. Quite simply, we argue that a determination of 
gentrification requires both displacement and the experience of displacement as unjust.
Large-scale real estate investments in Hanoi demonstrate elements of displacement only at 
the margin. Because NUAs are built on reclaimed agricultural land and leave residential land 
untouched, direct displacement is virtually nonexistent. Households are not economically 
displaced since they retain residential land use rights. Any physical displacement that does 
occur is indirect, taking the form of land expropriation for public infrastructure. Indirect 
displacement is also highly limited. Like economic displacement, displacement pressure is 
absent, since there is no need to move away. Exclusionary displacement, however, can be 
associated with the corner case of enclosure that excludes the possibility of expanding urban 
villages’ residential land to accommodate future generations.
Phenomenological displacement exists for some demographic groups. NUAs introduce new 
lifestyles and values that create unwelcome phenomenological displacement for some, 
typically older, villagers. However, the resistance to lifestyle changes triggered by the arrival 
of more affluent populations in polarizing, neoliberal, Western cities is not necessarily 
prevalent in the rapidly growing economies of East Asia, where such changes may actually 
be embraced. In the test case examined here, resistance is less about the transformation of 
community space and more about protecting households’ long-term economic interests. 
Additionally, in contrast to Western urbanites’ efforts to preserve household financial 
security in the face of growing precarity through the maintenance of existing social networks, 
periurban households in rapidly growing economies see ample opportunity and embrace 
changes that will position them effectively within that transition. Thus, urban transitions that 































































are understood as gentrification in Western cities are often welcomed in countries 
experiencing somewhat more inclusive forms of rapid economic growth.
Displacement either does not exist or is welcome. However, justice claims are still made. In 
Hanoi, people typically object not to displacement but to the distribution of value created by 
land redevelopment. This leaves generalized gentrification proponents with two choices. 
First, they could argue that the form of injustice in rapidly growing economies may differ 
from that in developed Western cities. If one accepts Shin’s (2009) claim that the form of 
gentrification in East Asia differs from that of the West, then it follows that injustice may 
also take different forms. One could argue that gentrification in the West is experienced as 
unjust due to the displacement it generates, and that this injustice manifests in place-based 
claims while the large-scale gentrification of East Asia, on the other hand, is experienced as 
unjust due to the inequitable distribution of newly created value. That is, the definition of 
justice must be contextualized. While this would be consistent with Shklar’s claim that the 
definition of justice evolves through localized experiences of injustice, some might object 
that this strategy would only further dissipate the concept of gentrification. More importantly, 
it also risks obscuring the terminological clarity of other forms of injustice that are not unique 
to one geographical region, like value grabbing, and thereby undermining the terminological 
traction for mobilizing resistance to those forms of injustice. We thus offer a second option.
If political traction matters, then naming matters (Fainstein, 2010). As argued above, 
“gentrification” is employed to mobilize political action in the face of perceived injustice. 
While the word has proven effective where the production of space for more affluent users 
initiates displacement that threatens households’ well-being, it is unlikely to be as effective 
when displacement offers new opportunities and promises a better living environment (real or 
imagined). For it is the experience of social injustice through displacement that gives the 
accusation of “gentrification” its political weight. Following Shklar (1992), it can be argued 
that the voice of the victims is primary in determinations of injustice that drive political 
action, and in Hanoi victims are concerned with different forms of injustice. New forms of 
injustice require new names. To mobilize around the injustice created by Hanoi’s large-scale 
residential projects, we therefore propose the alternative notions of “livelihoods 
dispossession” and “value grabbing”. These terms respectively capture the loss of livelihood 
security and the inequitable distribution of profits from redevelopment, the genuine concerns 
of villagers.































































Our reliance on Shklar’s position that injustice depends fundamentally on the perception of 
victims opens up an important avenue for future debate. We must now explore whose 
perception of injustice matters. As Shklar (1992: 39) points out, some people take up the 
cause of others they perceive to be victims of injustice even when those others do not make 
justice claims themselves. For instance, as discussed above, outside academics, media 
practitioners, and activists are often involved as political actors in reinforcing and broadening 
villagers’ injustice claims. If they identify injustice in the absence of victims’ claims, is it 
appropriate to call an urban transformation gentrification, livelihood dispossession, or value 
grabbing? Perhaps their political action can convince others that they, too, are experiencing a 
particular form of injustice, as may be the case for Ley and Teo’s claim that the 
epistemological recognition of gentrification is growing in Hong Kong. Perhaps victims of 
displacement are also victims of false consciousness and simply misread their plight. Perhaps, 
as DiGregorio (2011) and Hila Zaban (personal communication) suggest, social injustice only 
becomes clear years later after the true costs are reckoned as expansion turns to 
overexpansion or socio-economic conditions change. If so, the present welcoming of urban 
transformation may not reflect long term costs, and the voices of those currently anticipating 
or experiencing benefits from displacement must be discounted, a clear challenge for 
democratic process. If these politically mobilizing terms require a determination that social 
injustice is being done, we are now compelled to ask who has the authority to make that 
designation.  
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